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Abstract
Concurrency in multithreaded programs introduces additional complexity in software veriﬁcation
and testing, and thereby signiﬁcantly increases the cost of Quality Assurance (QA). We present
a case study in which a specialized model checker was used to discover concurrency errors in a
large preexisting code base. The results revealed race conditions that lead to data corruption
errors whose detection would have been prohibitively expensive with conventional testing and QA
methods. We describe our methodology and highlight parts of the methodology that could be
automated.
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1 Introduction
As software projects grow larger and more complex, techniques for detect-
ing errors in them become more important. Concurrency errors have been
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errors in large commercial systems is testing, of course; however, creating good
test cases is very diﬃcult, and testing for concurrency errors can be extremely
frustrating. We present a case study in which a specialized model checker
was used to discover concurrency errors in a large preexisting code base. We
also discuss ways to reduce the labor required to make this possible. In this
paper, we discuss the general problem of applying a model checker to a code
base in Section 2, the code base we were examining in Section 3, the results
we achieved by applying model checking to that code base in Section 4 and
Section 5, and reﬂections upon the methodology we used in Section 6.
Others have applied model checkers to programs before us. In [13], Yang,
Twohey et al. applied the CMC model checker [7] to the Linux kernel, specif-
ically on three ﬁlesystems, and found numerous errors in the ﬁlesystems that
could potentially cause data corruption or loss. In [1], Ball, Majumdar et al.
presented a method for performing predicate abstraction on C programs as
a part of the SLAM toolkit, with the intent of model checking the resulting
Boolean programs; they mention using this technique on NT device drivers,
among other programs. The Java PathFinder team was asked to ﬁnd an error
in NASA’s Remote Agent system; they describe their success in ﬁnding the
deadlock that nearly crippled the mission 60,000 miles into space in [3,10].
Our work diﬀers from the these eﬀorts in the following ways. First, we
worked on a large concurrent program looking for concurrency errors. The
Yang, Twohey et al. Linux eﬀort was primarily focused on crash recovery.
While that eﬀort simulated hardware level concurrency, for example with write
buﬀer reorderings, it was not looking for deadlocks, races and the like. Ball,
Majumdar et al.’s SLAM toolkit does not consider concurrent programs. We
diﬀer from the Remote Agent system both in terms of the size of the system
being run and because we went to some lengths to preserve as much of the
original system as possible; the Remote Agent was recoded into Java so that
the analysis could be applied.
2 Model Checking Programs
As a technique, applying model checking to programs warrants brief expla-
nation. Model checking was originally applied to hardware veriﬁcation, and
then to small, self contained, deliberately simpliﬁed models of a program or
protocol’s behavior. Here, every feasible state would be examined—either ex-
haustively or with the aid of mathematical formalisms that permit examining
multiple states at once—and various properties about the model’s behavior
could be veriﬁed. It has recently become feasible to run model checkers di-
rectly on the program itself, rather than some extracted artifact; checkers like
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Verisoft [2], CMC [7], and Java PathFinder [9] are examples of model checkers
designed to run on code. In our work, we have used Java PathFinder, whose
name we will frequently abbreviate as JPF.
As a practical tool, JPF can be viewed as a nondeterministic Java virtual
machine. All control nondeterminism must be made explicit, but concurrent
nondeterminism is automatically taken care of. As such, while JPF is not as
eﬃcient as dedicated model checkers like SPIN [4] at the problem of actual
model checking, it can be used in a very natural way to check that properties
in concurrent programs are upheld along any feasible execution path. A great
deal of eﬀort has gone into enhancing JPF’s ability to explore a large number
of Java machine states; for more details see [10].
JPF handles almost all pure Java code; exceptions include ﬁle input/output
or network traﬃc. JPF also cannot handle native methods, although the user
may provide pure Java versions for the simulation. These holes in JPF’s
ability to simulate a program can be patched using simpliﬁed versions of the
relevant classes. This replacement can be done without modifying the code
under examination, which is useful.
We found JPF useful because of its ability to run our target software,
which is written in Java. Because we were investigating concurrency errors,
its ability to try every serialization of the concurrent code was very attractive.
If we are exercising the code correctly, any deadlocks, races, or other errors
that are present—even if they are hard to trigger—should be noticed.
3 Codebase Overview
We applied the techniques discussed in Section 2 to the development tree of a
large client server codebase. The system possesses a number of diﬀerent user
interfaces and must communicate with several third party database products.
The user interface can be implemented either as a Java based thick client, Java
applets, or as web pages in a browser. The browser is served by the web tier,
which is comprised of JSP and servlet components running in a web server.
The main process logic and the analytics engine reside in a third tier. The
fourth tier contains the underlying repositories such as database, directory,
and document management as well as connectivity to other systems using a
variety of mechanisms. This structure is shown graphically in Figure 1. The
various modules communicate through Java RMI [11].
The version of the system we examined comprised well over a thousand
classes and a little over 470,000 lines of Java code. Because of its modular
design, as well as the fact that the interfaces between the modules are well
described through the RMI interfaces, there were very clear divisions in the
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Fig. 1. Codebase Structure
design. We used these divisions to control how much of the software we would
be forced to examine while model checking.
The use of RMI had an additional eﬀect. The version of RMI that is
shipped with Sun’s Java Development Kit, which is the version which was used
by the codebase, is implicitly concurrent. The default RMI server creates a
new thread for every client. Any software built upon it must be capable
of handling that level of concurrency. As well, in this case, concurrency is
exploited for scalability.
This concurrency can create a problem during development; debugging
complex concurrency code is notoriously diﬃcult, and reproducing deadlocks
and race conditions can be very involved. This is true even though in many
cases only a handful of threads are required to provoke the problem.
4 Applying Model Checking
So, the stage is set for analysis; we have a large concurrent program with
some diﬃcult to resolve concurrency errors, and a tool that should be good
at reliably reproducing these concurrency errors.
When we began our analysis, the development team informed us that there
was a deadlock that cropped up rarely under stress tests, and could we please
have a look? Neither of us had seen or worked with the system prior to this
analysis. The size of the project was intimidating, and we did not at the time
believe we would be able to analyze substantial portions of the code base due
to the state explosion problem.
We believed that the deadlock was probably related to the database in-
terface code. Because of the structure of the codebase, the database interface
ran behind an RMI server, entirely separate from the main code. The RMI
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interfaces seemed a logical place to begin, and we manually wrote the mini-
mal environment required to bring the database server up and ready to serve
requests. This environment was developed through an iterative process: the
database server would be run, it would immediately fail (in our case, frequently
due to some unset global variable), the environment would be modiﬁed accord-
ingly, and then rerun. At the time, we believed that this would be a good way
to explore the system and to ﬁnd which parts of it we would have to simulate
by hand to avoid state explosion.
It was necessary to replace some Java system classes so that the database
server could be brought up under JPF. The classes included:
• The RMI package had to be replaced with one that would not attempt to
connect to a network.
• The Date class, which was used by the system’s logging mechanism, was
modiﬁed to always give exactly the same time. This avoids a proliferation
of program states that were exactly identical save for a timestamp.
• The localization classes were deemed superﬂuous and stubbed out.
• JDBC and related database access classes needed to be replaced by a version
that was high ﬁdelity enough to the code base so that the code would work
correctly, but that did not store any unnecessary data.
We found that this phase required the most time investment, in part because
we were unfamiliar with the codebase.
4.1 Database Concurrency
When the environment generation was complete, we started driving the data-
base server using its RMI interface. The relevant portion of the nominal
protocol is as follows:
(i) Client code acquires the subsystem’s published interface, DbAdapter, us-
ing RMI.
(ii) Client code calls getConnection() on the DbAdapter, getting a
DbConnection.
(iii) Client code uses the database through the DbConnection.
(iv) Client code releases the connection; return to step 2.
This protocol is written as a state machine in Figure 2.
This protocol, as written, is too simplistic for real use. Creation of
DbConnection objects is very slow, and the database server tries to keep
a pool of allocated but unused connections around. This pool introduces an-
other problem. If the client does not perform step 4 for any reason—client
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Fig. 3. RMI protocol supposedly implemented
crashes, network errors, a hung client—the DbConnection object it is using
will never be returned to the pool. This will cause a resource leak.
To combat this, the database server checks each of its connections in step 2
to determine if the original client is still alive. If the server decides that client
is dead, then it will hand out an already allocated connection to the new client.
The amended protocol that the codebase claims to implement is diagrammed
in Figure 3.
If the network connection has actually been broken, this behavior is more
or less correct. However, the method used to determine whether a client is
dead or not is to see whether the connection is ﬁve minutes old. If for any
reason—database row locks, database backup, network latency, heavy load,
long computations on the client—a client takes more than ﬁve minutes to
process a transation, it runs the risk that its DbConnection will be given to
some other client. The protocol as implemented is described in Figure 4.
Fig. 2. RMI protocol in the absence of network disconnects
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Fig. 4. RMI protocol actually implemented
If a client should time out and then have its connection given away, it
is possible that two clients’ transactions could be interleaved. Additionally,
the JDBC standard does not mandate that java.sql.Connection objects be
thread safe. This has disastrous consequences, both for thread safety and for
database correctness.
This fault only shows up in the presence of concurrent behavior, and while
it can show up with just two clients, it is very unlikely that a client’s legitimate
transactions will take longer than ﬁve minutes except under a heavier load.
Reliably catching faults like this using a traditional testing methodology would
be diﬃcult.
To detect the problem, we created a stub client that fetched a DbAdapter,
called getConnection, used it for a while, and then released the connection.
We instantiated several such clients to access the server concurrently. Rather
than wait ﬁve minutes for timeouts to occur, we replaced the timeout code
with a call to JPF’s randomBool function, which forces JPF to explore the
cases when that Boolean value is true as well as when it is false. Thus, we
achieve coverage of all cases where any client could be disconnected at any
time. Finally we inserted assertions to check whether any two clients could
ever get the same DbConnection. JPF proved that this error was possible in
only a few minutes, which was a surprising result considering the amount of
code that was being run. We expected a state explosion and did not observe
it in this case.
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To solve the issue, we recommended that the database team either use a
more certain method of ascertaining whether a client is dead, or restructure
the protocol to avoid this sort of behavior.
4.2 Cache Veriﬁcation
After analyzing this portion of the code, at the request of the development
team we began analyzing an object cache, whose goal is to ensure that data-
base accesses occurred as seldom as possible.
This code contained numerous simple concurrency errors and poor design
decisions; a simplistic static checker like FindBugs [5] could have detected
most or all of them. The question of whether any of them could cause data
corruption remained open, however. Accordingly, we ran the system with
JPF using several threads working on diﬀerent objects. We discovered in the
process of running this that all of the threads were attempting to work on the
same database object (object #0, as it happened). Confused, we spent some
time trying to determine how our environment was faulty, in the belief that
the system could not possibly be misbehaving in this fashion—it had, after
all, been running its test cases and in production for years.
Tracing the error, we found that when the object cache reads a process
deﬁnition from the database, the object cache stores the process deﬁnition’s
unique object identiﬁer in a local ﬁeld. When a new process deﬁnition is
created, the identiﬁer has not yet been determined. After the process deﬁnition
is saved to the database, and thus assigned a unique object identiﬁer, the
object cashe should update its copy of that object identiﬁer. Instead, the
object cache leaves its copy set to the default value of 0.
This bug was found almost immediately during the stress run, but the tests
had obviously not been written to catch such an error. We would not have
found it had we not discovered several threads which started out with entirely
separate process deﬁnitions all ending up with the same one, a violation of
the cache contract. We analyze this behavior further in Section 7.
5 Results
We mentioned proving that a subtle bug exists in the database adapter com-
munications protocol described in Section 4.1, and also proof of an error in
the concurrent cache in Section 4.2 but did not give the results there; we do
so here.
With the communications protocol, the process of ﬁxing the error was
diﬃcult enough that we cannot provide veriﬁcation timing; however, the iden-
tiﬁcation of the error was done in 108 seconds. Further data on that run is
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available in Table 1.
With the concurrent cache, we found the error in 56 seconds, with fur-
ther data in Table 2. Unfortunately veriﬁcation of the ﬁxed but otherwise
untuned cache did not complete in a reasonable amount of time. However,
with manual slicing and with the insertion of the appropriate synchronization
to remove a number of benign races, we achieved veriﬁcation with two threads
in 21 hours; further details are in Table 3. With very strict synchronization—
speciﬁcally, every public method of the cache locked the cache class object,
ensuring that all cache operations were synchronous—veriﬁcation with two




Maximum stack depth 4,509
Intermediate steps 45
Memory used 128.83 MB
Memory used after gc 110.37 MB
Storage memory 0.0 B
Collected objects 2,186
Mark and sweep runs 3,784
Execution time 108.404 s
Speed 43 tr/s
Table 1
Proof of Database Adapter Bug
6 Methodology
As we brieﬂy discussed in Section 4, our methodology is as follows:
(i) Find an invariant to check.
(ii) Try to run the program to check it.
(iii) If a fault occurs because the environment is insuﬃciently faithful to the
original system, improve the ﬁdelity of the environment and go back to




Maximum stack depth 718
Intermediate steps 26
Memory used 22.62 MB
Memory used after gc 14.56 MB
Storage memory 0.0 B
Collected objects 10,284
Mark and sweep runs 30,160
Execution time 55.648 s
Speed 642 tr/s
Table 2
Proof of Concurrent Cache Bug
step 2.
(iv) If the system takes too long to run, ﬁnd what is taking all the time and
replace it with a stub with more abstract behavior. Go back to step 2.
(v) If the invariant is violated, check to make sure that it could occur in the
original system, and if so, report a violation. If not, correct the problem
by improving the ﬁdelity of the system and go back to step 2.
(vi) If no invariants are violated, check to make sure that your driving system
is adequately faithful. If it is, report success. Otherwise, improve the
ﬁdelity of the system accordingly and go back to step 2.
This method is not an algorithm in the sense that these steps are not
mechanical processes; the correct thing to do requires experience with model
checking and with the system. Also, whether the method will terminate is
questionable. Almost all of the eﬀort is spent doing what amounts to envi-
ronment generation, not checking as such.
Some of the classes that we had to replace with stubs were required either
as a logical consequence of the limitations of JPF, e.g. RMI; or required
because of linkage to a third party product, e.g. JDBC. Any analysis on this
code base will almost certainly have to stub classes in those two categories out,
because JPF does not and cannot handle network code directly in its current




Maximum stack depth 1,234
Intermediate steps 191,058
Memory used 511.16 MB
Memory used after gc 462.51 MB
Storage memory 0.0 B
Collected objects 10,922,272
Mark and sweep runs 45,082,614
Execution time 20:54:55.075 s
Speed 745 tr/s
Table 3
Veriﬁcation of Concurrent Cache Correctness (appropriate synchronization)
form, and because simulating a relational database will probably cause the
analyses to take far too long.
It would be very helpful if this entire process could be automated, and
indeed the SLAM eﬀorts mentioned in Section 1 do automate a similar proce-
dure for single threaded C programs. They use predicate abstraction, which
has some attractive theoretical qualities, but it is not clear how to extend their
technique to multithreaded programs.
A tool to automate this environment genreration would be very useful.
This is an active research question. In [8], Tkachuk, Dwyer et al., describe a
way to derive the driving system automatically. In [6], Khurshid et al. describe
a technique for using JPF to generate test cases. In [12] Xie et al. describe
a similar technique using exhaustive runs for the purpose of generating test
cases. These techniques are very interesting but in their current form they
would not have been valuable to us because they explore the program only
to a bounded depth in the program’s call tree. Due to our system’s internal
structure, we feel we would need to set the bound depth too high to make the
technique useful.
A diﬀerent but no less important question is that of “how did we know
where to look?” and the related question of “what sorts of questions are




Maximum stack depth 1,232
Intermediate steps 193,554
Memory used 285.28 MB
Memory used after gc 254.47 MB
Storage memory 0.0 B
Collected objects 9,913,584
Mark and sweep runs 23,655,230
Execution time 15:54:04.732 s
Speed 502 tr/s
Table 4
Veriﬁcation of Concurrent Cache Correctness (strict synchronization)
appropriate for using model checking?” In our case, we were directed to
problems by the development team that speciﬁed in one case a problem they
had been having a great deal of trouble ﬁnding, and in the other case a request
to verify that a speciﬁc module was sound. In both cases, we extracted a state
machine describing the input of the module in question, and then explored that
state machine looking for violations of simple properties; properties like “do
any two clients ever share a DbConnection?” and “can the cache fall out of
synchronization with the database?”
Because the systems in question used concurrency extensively, either im-
plicitly as any RMI client does, or explicitly in the case of the cache, testing
these properties is diﬃcult and timing prone. Testing also has trouble answer-
ing liveness properties—properties like “if a client has a DbConnection it will
eventually release it”. Accordingly we believe that an appropriate use of a
model checker is the systematic exploration of the interface to a module while
examining important invariants.
How feasible is model checking programs today? Currently experts are
needed to close the system in a way that explores its behavior adequately but
does not cause the model checker to explode. However it is possible, as we
have shown, to examine even large modules, or modules deeply intermixed
with the rest of large system, with JPF in its current form.
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7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that signiﬁcant analyses can be performed using model
checking on preexisting software, even software that is not designed for model
checking. We expected to run into the major problem bedeviling analysis
of large programs using model checking—the state explosion problem—and
largely did not. Environment generation, on the other hand, represented most
of the eﬀort.
We believe there are two major reasons why we did not experience state ex-
plosion problems. The ﬁrst reason is that our system is software for business,
and speciﬁcally software for business that stores almost all mutable state in a
database. Because we abstract the database, we also abstract almost all mu-
table state in the program, meaning the number of distinct states we explore
is not as large as it might be presumed to be.
The second reason is that most of our analyses were to detect the presence
of errors. It is possible that there is an error in only one or two possible
state conﬁgurations, of many, and so a search of the entire state space to
prove correctness is necessary. However, we found several errors that would
be triggered along many diﬀerent state conﬁgurations, and so ﬁnding one of
these does not require as much work as searching the entire state space. In
fact for many types of concurrency errors it is possible that any possible state
save for a very few can exhibit the error. Examples of such concurrency errors
include simple data races, or our analysis of the communication protocol. For
us to test the communication protocol and not ﬁnd a problem, all of the
threads will have to go through their entire set of operations without ever
triggering the disconnect. This is very possible in testing, but because we
explore the state space where any of the threads could be disconnected, we
ﬁnd the error almost immediately.
One positive attribute to our analysis is that our ﬁdelity to the original sys-
tem is deliberately high. We have stubbed out as few components as possible,
and by and large the components we removed were communication libraries
like JDBC and RMI that are simultaneously independent of the codebase and
easily modeled.
As stated earlier, the biggest hurdle we had in performing this work was the
amount of eﬀort required to do environment generation. We have discussed
several recent eﬀorts in this direction and hope that soon this will be an
operation that requires much less manual labor.
We thank Dr. Willem Visser for being immensely helpful with JPF.
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